



Border Violence Monitoring Network

ILLEGAL PUSHBACKS AND BORDER VIOLENCE REPORTS

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POLICE

JUNE 2022 BALKAN REGION

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In June, the Border Violence Monitoring Network (BVMN) shared 14 testimonies of pushbacks impacting 676 people-on-the-move (POM) across the Balkans and Greece. This report brings together first-hand testimonies from a range of countries in the region to look at the way European Union states and other actors are affecting systemic violence towards people crossing borders.

In analyzing trends in testimonies of pushbacks from the last month, two trends stand out: (1) the presence of third country nationals (TCN) assisting state authorities in perpetrating pushbacks along the Evros River at the Greek-Turkish border, and the presence of foreign officers in pushbacks from Hungary to Serbia. The consistent involvement of TCN assisting Greek authorities in perpetrating pushbacks in the Evros region has been documented by the BVMN since late 2020, and also is backed up by a recent investigation by Lighthouse Reports, Der Spiegel, LeMonde, the Guardian, and other media outlets, detailing this practice and identifying for the first time six people who had been coerced into doing this work. The presence of foreign officers assisting local authorities in perpetrating pushbacks in the Balkans has also been documented by the BVMN across multiple Balkan border areas, and speaks to wider knowledge and complicity in this illegal practice.

In updates from the field, the report first covers violent squat evictions in Velika Kladusa (BiH), and the lack of running water in Lipa Camp during the recent heat wave. A recent shooting in Serbia, in which two people died and many were injured is also analyzed within the context of state and parastate violence experienced by people-on-the-move.

Several key developments from Greece are also considered, starting with the ruling of the ECHR in the landmark case *Safi and Others v. Greece*. On the 7th of July, The European Court of Human Rights **ruled** that Greece violated the European Convention of Human Rights over the sinking of a migrant boat in 2014 in which 11 asylum seekers, among them eight children, lost their lives (*Safi and Others v. Greece*). The 16 survivors claimed that the Greek coast guard sank the boat when they towed it at high speed towards Turkey. From there, the report also touches on recent developments in terms of accountability for pushbacks in the Evros Region, and political responses to the release of the BVMN report **“Islets, Interim Measures, and Illegal Pushbacks: Erosion of Rule of Law in Greece”**.

Final sections consider the recent ECHR case *Akkad v. Turkey* and the forced deportation of Syrians from Turkey to Syria, as well as updates from Solidarians in the Piazza Libertá in Trieste, Italy.

BVMN is a network of watchdog organisations active in the Balkans, Greece and Turkey including No Name Kitchen, Rigardu, Are You Syrious, Mobile Info Team, Josoor, InfoKolpa, Centre for Peace Studies, Mare Liberum, Collective Aid, Blindspots and Pushback Alarmphone Austria.

GENERAL

REPORTING NETWORK

BVMN is a collaborative project between multiple grassroots organisations and NGOs working along the Western Balkan Route and Greece, documenting violations at borders directed towards people-on-the-move. The members have a common website database, used as a platform to collate testimonies of illegal pushbacks which are gathered through interviews.

TERMINOLOGY

The term *pushback* is a key component of the situation that unfolded along the EU borders (Hungary and Croatia) with Serbia in 2016, after the closure of the Balkan route. Push-back describes the informal expulsion (without due process) of an individual or group to another country. This lies in contrast to the term “deportation”, which is conducted in a legal framework. Push-backs have become an important, if unofficial, part of the migration regime of EU countries and elsewhere.

METHODOLOGY

The methodological process for these interviews leverages the close social contact that we have as independent volunteers with refugees and migrants to monitor pushbacks at multiple borders. When individuals return with significant injuries or stories of abuse, one of our violence reporting volunteers will sit down with them to collect their testimony. Although the testimony collection itself is typically with a group no larger than five persons, the pushback groups which they represent can be as large as 50 persons. We have a standardised framework for our interview structure which blends the collection of hard data (dates, geo-locations, officer descriptions, photos of injuries/medical reports, etc.) with open narratives of the abuse.

ABBREVIATIONS

BiH - BosniaandHerzegovina
HR - Croatia
SRB - Serbia
SLO - Slovenia
ROM - Romania
HUN - Hungary
ALB - Albania
BGR - Bulgaria
MNK - NorthMacedonia
GRK - Greece
TUR - Turkey
EU - European Union

TRENDS IN BORDER VIOLENCE

TCN ASSISTING POLICE IN PUSHBACKS OVER THE EVROS, BREAKTHROUGH INVESTIGATION

In every testimony recorded in June, respondents mentioned the presence of third country nationals (TCN) working with the police in pushing people back to Turkey. Respondents elaborate that these TCN, often present at the pushback point wearing balaclavas camouflage clothes, “are working with the police. that they work with them and they are responsible” (4.2) and that “if you want to stay in Greece, you have to tell to policeman ‘I want to work with you. After working for 6 months, he gives you like an ID to stay in Greece. (4.6). The ID mentioned is likely a police note, a document issued by the police to third-country nationals who have illegally entered Greece, after being arrested prior to often registering an application for asylum.

The consistent involvement of TCN assisting Greek authorities in perpetrating pushbacks in the Evros region has been documented by the BVMN since late 2020.

In June 2022, Lighthouse Reports, Der Spiegel, LeMonde, the Guardian, and other media outlets, published a **breakthrough investigation** detailing this practice and identifying for the first time six people who had been coerced into doing this work. The men—some of whom referred to themselves as slaves— were kept locked up between operations and forced to assist in driving the boats used to push people back to Turkey. Some had been forcibly recruited after crossing the border, while others were lured there by smugglers working with a gangmaster who is hosted in a container located in the carpark of a Greek police station. In return for their “work” they received papers allowing them to stay in Greece for 25 days.

These testimonies, together with the journalistic investigation, show how systemic pushbacks and other human rights violations in the Evros region, and how entrenched these practices have become in Greek authorities responses to migration and border control.

FOREIGN OFFICERS COLLABORATING WITH LOCAL AUTHORITIES ON PUSHBACKS

During the month of June and the immediate period preceding it there were multiple reports of non-Hungarian officers being present at and actively participating in violent pushbacks at the Serbian-Hungarian border around Horgos, which has increasingly become a hotspot in terms of numbers of people-on-the-move attempting to cross and being pushed back as numbers in northern Serbia have increased during the summer months. In at least four reports, individuals who were violently pushed back into Serbia after crossing identified non-Hungarian officers by the languages spoken and flag insignia on their uniforms. In two of the reports the officers were identified as Czech, in one as German, and in another as unidentified but not Hungarian due to wearing different flags and speaking another language. In one of the incidents the respondent identified something that resembled the NATO emblem; in another, a Frontex car.

The ability of people-on-the-move to identify precisely the nationality of third-country military or police is naturally limited, especially due to the tear gas and physical violence the individuals were subjected to in all four cases. However, despite the challenges involved in pinning down the specific units and nationalities involved, the recurrence of these reports strongly indicates the involvement of other European police and/or military forces in illegal pushbacks on the Serbian-Hungarian border. This evidence is corroborated by other NGOs active in Serbia who have similarly received reports of Polish, Austrian and German police involvement in pushbacks.

UPDATE ON THE SITUATION

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

VIOLENT EVICTIONS IN VELIKA KLADUŠA

This month, Bosnian police evicted three squats (empty buildings which are used as temporary housing) in Velika Kladuša, undermining the autonomy of people-on-the-move in the area. The people were taken into buses of the International Organisation of Migration (IOM) and were brought to the Lipa Camp at a distance of 80 km. The police destroyed the infrastructure in the squats and broke mobile phones. Some affected persons told us that they were insulted and beaten by the police. The police tried to evict more buildings but the inhabitants were able to escape to the nearby woods.



Image Description: Picture of the landscape in Lipa, BiH (source NNK)

“We are sleep in the velika kaladuša one old factory and there lipa police come they have have black uniform and with him IOM. IOM come and when they he give everyone kicked and punch and they speak bad he use bad words for my family ome one boy with police they say he fuck my mother and is really bad police and they broken door and some mobile and they make pictures without reason and they speak like we are animal.. (...)“

We condemn the cooperation between police and the UN- funded nongovernmental organizations in conducting violent evictions of people-on-the-move, and the broader complicity of such organizations in violence perpetrated against people-on-the-move: in camps, urban centers, as well as in border zones.

NO RUNNING WATER IN CAMPS IN BIHAC DURING HEAT WAVE

Since 2018, Bosnia has become one of the main recipients of EU funds for the outsourcing of migration management to non-EU countries. In the Una Sana Canton (Bosnia's region bordering Croatia), Lipa Camp or “Temporary Reception Center” (TRC) was opened officially in 2021 in the outskirts of Bihac. The **camp is managed** by the International Organization of Migration (IOM) and the Service for Foreigners' Affairs (SFA), a branch of the Bosnian Ministry of Security. Lipa Camp also received fundings from the **German Federal Agency for Technical Relief, the Austrian Federal Ministry of Interior, the Austrian Development Agency, the Swiss Government, the Vatican, the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation and the Council of Europe**. However, despite large investments into the camp's infrastructure over the last years residents at Lipa continue to lack the most fundamental services for a life with dignity.

The decision to build Lipa Camp in rural Bosnia is not by chance and reflects the segregatory policies. To reach the city center, those living in Lipa have to walk for seven hours to reach shops and services. Public spaces in Bihac are often sites of violent discrimination against POMs, with police officers shouting at people that it is forbidden for them to stay in the city center, to play football in the park, or to smoke a cigarette on a bench. Combined, these factors have resulted in Lipa becoming a segregatory space where POMs disappear from the sight of locals to inhabit a reality of temporal uncertainty in which violence against POM can go unnoticed by the wider society.

At the end of June, it was announced that starting on June 28th water would be temporarily unavailable. Residents have reported that toilet and shower facilities did not work for over a week. The only water available, both for cleaning purposes and drinking, was delivered by a cistern truck. As temperatures reached peaks of 37° in the Una Sana Canton, residents at Lipa Camp had rationed drinking water and could not shower nor flush toilets. "It's really hot here, concrete and metal Lipa, literally hell" one resident of Lipa reported to NNK volunteers. Lipa camp consists of a cement site, surrounded by barbed wire and organized in containers with six beds each. The lack of running water, combined with the already harsh living conditions, has further degraded the lives of people at Lipa camp.

This suspension of fundamental services such as water, however, does not represent an isolated issue, but rather is related to broader structural issues within Lipa Camp. Lipa Camp effectively detains and divides people. As the camp is exclusively populated by single men, older than eighteen years old, families who arrive in Bihac are generally split between Lipa and Borici Camp, the designated location for women and minors.

Many people have reported being treated as prisoners. Apart from breakfast, people complain about food which mainly consists of rice and bread, thus lacking the necessary nutritious properties for a healthy diet. Kitchens are available for use and internal NGOs provide, at times, fresh food for residents to cook. This does not change the fact that many suffer from intestinal problems and hemorrhoids pointing again to the degrading living conditions of the camp. These are also confirmed by the protests, including **hunger strikes**, that residents at Lipa have conducted in these years.

In addition to this, the prison-like setting of Lipa is reinforced by the climate of discipline and punishment enforced by police functionaries. Acts of physical violence against residents are in fact the norm and only add up to previous traumas. A respondent recalled an incident in which a person with mental disabilities started screaming whilst queuing for food. Police went over to him and started slapping him in front of everyone. This climate of terror is heightened by the use of extensive surveillance mechanisms and restrictions on mobility (ex. 10 pm curfew), which continue to be enforced by camp authorities to reproduce forms of discipline and social control.




Image Description: Communication at Lipa Camp to announce the suspension of running water. (source NNK)



Image Description: cistern truck delivering water at Lipa camp (source NNK)

SERBIA

SUBOTICA SHOOTING

On the morning of July 2nd a shooting involving two different groups of people-on-the-move (POM) left two dead and multiple injured. Heavily armed police forces also participated in the firefight. The shooting took place in the outskirts of Subotica, in the forest next to the Serbian-Hungarian border.

The incident has been framed by local media and policymakers to present the issue of movement in the region in terms of securitization and militarization of the area. The presidents of North-Bač, West-Bač and North-Banat administrative districts held an emergency meeting in Kikinda a couple of days after the shooting, and **pointed out that** "activities of competent entities must be strengthened, as well as cooperation with police administrations in order to ensure greater safety of the population in the territory of the district". Meanwhile, local police forces have already increased their presence in Subotica and begun apprehending any POM found in the city center, taking them to unknown locations. **The plan of the Commissariat** is to relocate the migrants who are currently in the Subotica reception center to several other centers in the country.

There is a fear among actors in the field that this increase in policies of securitization in Northern Serbia will be a political move to cleanse cities from POM's presence, further pushing them away from local communities, negatively affecting their chance to be autonomous in their material needs. Stepping aside from the apparent unwillingness to tackle the underlying issues, this move could very well increase POM's reliance on smugglers, further worsening the situation.

BIRN journalist Saša Dragojlo **wrote that** "the most responsible for this situation is the state, because it is obvious that it cooperates with certain smugglers". Once again, borders and their political, social, and military apparatuses reproduce and intensify the landscape of violence in which POM are forced to live.

The issue, however, involves several actors - at the local, regional as well as European level. Radoš Đurović, president of the Center for Protection and Assistance to Asylum Seekers, **stated that the issue** is "fences, pushbacks, violence and futile attempts to stop intercontinental migration to the EU zone with violence".

Meanwhile, while the heads of government are busy discussing how dangerous people are on the move, the border and border police continue to perpetrate violence and illegal practices.

GREECE

ECHR RULING SLAMS GREECE IN (SAFI AND OTHERS V. GREECE)

On the 7th of July, The European Court of Human Rights **ruled** that Greece violated the European Convention of Human Rights over the sinking of a migrant boat in 2014 in which 11 asylum seekers, among them eight children, lost their lives (Safi and Others v. Greece). The 16 survivors claimed that the Greek coast guard sank the boat when they towed it at high speed towards Turkey.

A 21-year-old Syrian refugee initially was found guilty by the Greek courts for the shipwreck and the drowning of the 12 Afghans. He was accused of driving the vessel and was sentenced to 145 years and 3 months in prison and a fine of 570,000 euros. A Court of Appeal ruled in 2017 that no person on the vessel could have prevented the fatal shipwreck and commuted the Syrian's sentence to ten years and, according to the criminal code, he was set to be released.

The decision of the ECHR in Safi and Others v Greece stands as a landmark decision and a huge step forward in efforts to seek perpetrators of pushbacks accountable, and has been celebrated by human rights defenders and **civil society actors** in Greece. Konstantinos Tsitselikis, Professor of Human Rights Law at the University of Macedonia and one of the lawyers representing the survivors **describes the case as** : "it is the only one of its kind and it brings back to the public debate the issue of pushbacks and the 'legendary' security of the Greek and European borders. This issue does not concern only Greece but also the EU's".

In the ruling, the court held that Greek Authorities had violated Articles 2 (right to life) and 3 (prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment) of the European Convention on Human Rights, **stating**:

“The Court found that the Greek authorities had not done all that could reasonably be expected of them to provide the applicants and their relatives with the level of protection required by Article 2 of the Convention. A violation of Article 3 (prohibition of inhuman or degrading treatment), concerning 12 of the applicants who had been on board the boat and who, after it had sunk, had been subjected to degrading treatment on account of the body searches they had undergone on arriving in Farmakonisi”.

The Greek state was obliged to pay 330,000 euros in respect of the non-pecuniary damage sustained by the applicants, broken down as follows: EUR 100,000 to one of the applicants, EUR 80,000 to three of the applicants jointly, EUR 40,000 to another of the applicants, and EUR 10,000 to each of the remaining 11 applicants.

EVROS ISLET REPORT AND POLITICAL RESPONSES

In late June/early July, a series of groundbreaking reports and investigations by both journalistic sources and civil society actors shed light on the specific methods used by Greek authorities in perpetrating illegal pushbacks, and systemic human rights violations at the Evros border. The investigation released by Lighthouse Reports in collaboration with Der Spiegel, LeMonde, derSpiegel, the Guardian, and other media outlets, **exposed** how Greek authorities force people-on-the-move to do the “dirty work” of pushing people back. Following this, the Border Violence Monitoring Network released **a report** on the erosion of rule of law in Greece, providing clear step-by-step analysis of three cases in which people-on-the-move were pushed back by Greek authorities and left stranded on islets in the river. The report further discusses the recent increase in use of Rule 39 measures and appeals to the ECHR on the Greek mainland in these cases, in efforts to secure access to international protection for victims of pushbacks by Greek authorities. In all three cases, civil society organisations, including the Greek Council for Refugees, Human Rights360, AlarmPhone, and The Rule 39 Initiative submitted applications for interim measures on the behalf of the transit groups, and a Rule 39 decision was indicated by the European Court of Human Rights, legally binding the Greek state to provide temporary access to Greece and material reception conditions. Despite the Court's rulings, as well as the extensive public documentation of the cases on social media platforms and in news outlets, all three transit groups were reportedly pushed back to Turkey after several days on the islets without food, water, or medical care.

The report received wide support from members of the European Parliament, the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Defenders, and other civil society actors in the field. Days later, European Parliament member Tineke Strik accused Greek PM Kyriakos Mitsotakis of covering up evidence of refugee pushbacks in Mediterranean waters during a speech in a session of the EP, **stating**: “When asylum seekers try to enter Europe from your country, these people's rights are ruthlessly violated and (they are) pushed back to Turkish soil...,” and further that “Evidence is recorded by UN bodies, NGOs and investigative journalists. European judges refuse to accept a reality that violates core EU values.” The BVMN also sent and later published a **Letter of Concern to Frontex** over fundamental rights violations in the Evros, calling for the agency to trigger Article 46 of the European Border and Coast Guard Regulation (EU) 2019/1896 and, effective immediately, terminate operations in Greece.

Full report can be found here:
<https://www.borderviolence.eu/20548-2/>

TURKEY

FORCED RETURNS OF SYRIANS, AKKAD V. TURKEY

Amid reports of an upcoming military initiative by Turkey in Syria, the Turkish government intensifies its policy of forceful repatriation of Syrian refugees, whilst increasingly limiting the personal freedoms of those still living in the country. As resentment against refugees in Turkey increases and in view of the upcoming elections, it pushes forward repatriations to so-called "protection zones" which Turkey **set up along the border with Syria**. Labeled as "voluntary returns", Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has expressed plans to send around one million Syrian refugees back to Syria. However, numerous reports from people of concern show the use of force employed as well as the arbitrariness of the returns.

In a significant decision of the ECtHR of 21 June, the Court ruled for a Syrian national who had been **pulled back by Turkish forces and was repatriated to Syria** afterwards (Akkad v. Turkey, **Application no. 1557/19**). Since 2014 he had lived in the country, with temporary protection status. Whilst his family had made it to Germany and were granted refugee status, he had been excluded from family reunification as he had turned 18 a short time before. In 2018, when trying to enter Greece with the aspiration of reuniting with his family, he was apprehended by the Turkish authorities and deported to Syria two days later, without being able to take any action against this return decision. The applicant claimed that he was handcuffed during the bus journey of approximately 20 hours towards Hatay province near the Syrian border, where he was made to sign a document he did not understand but which turned out to be a form for voluntary return to his country of origin.

Throughout the whole time, he was not allowed to use the phone, was not provided with an interpreter and was not able to contact any lawyer or appeal authority. According to the applicant, he was apprehended by two armed militants of the Al-Nusra organisation immediately after crossing the border, blindfolded, interrogated and beaten.

The Court found that the applicant was subjected to a forcible return and ruled that there were two violations of Article 3 of the **Convention**, as well as violations of Article 5 (1), (2), (4) and (5). The first violation of Article 3 was due to the applicant's return to Syria, which is known to be a war zone. Furthermore, the Court pointed out that legal safeguards under the Turkish legislation were not respected, as it establishes that a holder of temporary protection could be expelled only in exceptional circumstances, which had not been invoked in this case. In addition, he was returned without being informed of the reasons for his detention or having the possibility of accessing suspensive remedies, including of appealing the decision before his removal to Syria.

Secondly, Article 3 ECHR was also found to be breached due to the handcuffing of the applicant during his detention and transfer as this was not justified by a context of lawful detention. Consequently, the Court considered that the applicant had been subjected to degrading treatment.

ITALY

TRIESTE UPDATES

In June 2022, activists and volunteers in Piazza Libertà in Trieste noticed a considerable increase in the number of arrivals of people via the Balkan routes. A total of 867 persons passed by the Piazza, sharing talks, stories and hopes. The number of people passing by Trieste has increased in comparison to past months, as the summer season is generally a safer time for people to travel and reach their destinations. Pakistan and Afghanistan are the main countries of origin among those arriving, but also people from Bangladesh, Nepal, India and Kurdistan passed through this month.

Solidarians met some children traveling alone (82), some women travelling alone (4), families with children (13 families for a total of 61 people), and people with serious illness (3). Some people wanted to stay in Trieste, some wanted to reach their friends and families in other Italian cities, and some others had their final geographical goal somewhere else in Europe.



Image Description: Police presence on Piazza Libertá

Connected to the general increase in people in transit, the number of people being apprehended at the border area has also risen. While there have not yet been any cases of refoulement, there have been cases of malpractice by border authorities or situations where the right to ask for asylum is not respected.

The considerable increase in arrivals has led the reception system to implode, despite the fact it was to be expected that the number of arrivals would increase during summer months. This can be understood as being connected to a lack of political will on an institutional level to improve the reception system both in quantity and in quality. To provide an example, Campo Sacro which until 1 June was used as a quarantine center, has since been used for extraordinary reception, i.e. waiting for asylum seekers to be transferred elsewhere. However, the facility cannot accommodate all asylum seekers (people are tracked down along the border and given a 'letter of invitation' with which they have to present themselves at the police station to formalise their asylum claim) and therefore many eligible persons have to spend many days on the street before eventually being accepted.

This is why the activists/volunteers in piazza Libertá this month have continued in their efforts to support POM either waiting to continue their journey or waiting for their right to asylum to be exercised. This increase in POM has also brought public attention to piazza Libertá, resulting in checks and disturbances by the municipal police calls for immediate intervention by the mayor of Trieste.

Linea d'Ombra, an organization which works to affirm the rights of people to move freely, **promptly answered** to these silly provocations from the mayor: "State institutions are, in fact, the primary culprits of this unfortunate situation that has been going on for a long time, since they decided to shut the only day center of the city".

The situation on piazza Libertá is constantly evolving: on July 13, police forces charged PoM found resting in piazza Libertá with 100 Euro fines. One member of Digos, the Italian political police force, was heard saying to a group of local police: "People [i.e. people-on-the-move] must not be allowed to stay here, scare them away". Collectives expect this fragile balance not to last long.

GLOSSARY OF REPORTS, JUNE 2022

In May, BVMN shared 14 testimonies of pushbacks impacting 676 people-on-the-move across the Balkans. Those affected by these incidents included men, women, children with guardians, and unaccompanied children. They also represent a wide demographic, including people from Afghanistan, Iran, Syria, Morocco, Iraq, Algeria, Pakistan, and Kurdistan

- 5 Pushback to Serbia (1 from Romania, 4 from Hungary)
- 4 Pushbacks to Bosnia-Herzegovina from Croatia.
- 6 Pushbacks to Turkey from Greece

Romania to Serbia				
1.1	21st June	21st June	Sudan	6
Hungary to Serbia				
2.1	2nd June	3rd June	Morocco, Tunisia	20
2.2	20th June	24th June	Morocco	1
2.3	23rd June	24th June	Tunisia	15
Croatia to Bosnia-Herzegovina				
3.1	10th May	13th May	Pakistan	2
3.2	21 May	24th May	Pakistan, India	3
3.3	20th June		Sierra Leone, Unknown	11
3.4	2nd June	7th June	Pakistan	7
Greece to Turkey				
4.1	1st May	27th May	Syria, Morocco	107
4.2	14th April	28th June	Syria, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Kurdistan, Iraq, Palestine	65
4.3	1st May	28th June	Syria, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Kurdistan, Iraq, Palestine	64
4.4	30th April	27th June	Morocco, Pakistan, Kurdistan, Sudan, Algeria	125
4.5	2nd May	15th June	Afghanistan, Pakistan, Syria, Morocco, Algeria	200
4.6	29th March	7th May	Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, Algeria, Tunisia, Yemen, Somalia	50

NETWORK STRUCTURE AND CONTACT

B O R D E R

**V I O L E N C E
M O N I T O R I N G**

N E T W O R K

BVMN is a volunteer led endeavor, acting as an alliance of organisations in the Western Balkans and Greece. BVMN is based on the efforts of participant organizations working in the field of documentation, media, advocacy and litigation. We finance the work through charitable grants and foundations, and are not in receipt of funds from any political organisation. The expenditures cover transport subsidies for volunteers in the field and four paid positions.

To follow more from the Border Violence Monitoring Network, check out our [website](#) for the entire testimony archive, previous monthly reports and regular news pieces. To follow us on social media, find us on Twitter handle [@Border_Violence](#) and on [Facebook](#). For further information regarding this report or more on how to become involved please email us at mail@borderviolence.eu. For press and media requests please contact: press@borderviolence.eu



**Border Violence
Monitoring Network**