



# Border Violence Monitoring Network

## ILLEGAL PUSHBACKS AND BORDER VIOLENCE REPORTS



**JULY 2022  
BALKAN REGION**

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# GENERAL

## REPORTING NETWORK

BVMN is a collaborative project between multiple grassroots organisations and NGOs working along the Western Balkan Route and Greece, documenting violations at borders directed towards people-on-the-move. The partners have a common [website](#) database, used as a platform to collate testimonies of illegal pushbacks which are gathered through interviews.

## METHODOLOGY

The methodological process for these interviews leverages the close social contact that we have as independent volunteers with refugees and migrants to monitor pushbacks at multiple borders. When individuals return with significant injuries or stories of abuse, one of our violence reporting volunteers will sit down with them to collect their testimony. Although the testimony collection itself is typically with a group no larger than five persons, the pushback groups which they represent can exceed 50 persons. We have a standardised framework for our interview structure which blends the collection of hard data (dates, geo-locations, officer descriptions, photos of injuries/medical reports, etc.) with open narratives of the abuse.

## TERMINOLOGY

The term pushback is a key component of the situation that unfolded along the EU borders (Hungary and Croatia) with Serbia in 2016, after the closure of the Balkan Route. Pushback describes the informal expulsion (without due process) of an individual or group to another country. This lies in contrast to the term “deportation”, which is conducted in a legal framework. Pushbacks have become an important, if unofficial, part of the migration regime of EU countries and elsewhere.

## ABBREVIATIONS

BiH – Bosnia and Herzegovina  
HRV – Croatia  
SRB – Serbia  
SLO – Slovenia  
ROM – Romania  
HUN – Hungary  
AUT – Austria  
MNK – North Macedonia  
GRC – Greece  
BGR – Bulgaria  
TUR – Turkey  
EU – European Union

# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In July, the Border Violence Monitoring Network (BVMN)<sup>1</sup> shared 18 testimonies of pushbacks impacting 273 people-on-the-move (POM) across the Balkans and Greece. This report brings together first-hand testimonies from a range of countries in the region to look at the way European Union states and other actors are affecting systemic violence towards people crossing borders.

In trends in testimonies collected in July, the BVMN observed a continuation of past human rights violations and pushbacks from North Macedonia to Greece. The rest of the report focuses on updates from the field, starting with a complaint filed by an unaccompanied Rohingya child to the European Court of Human Rights over abuses and denial of access to rights in Croatia and Slovenia.

In Serbia this month, police conducted raids on a large abandoned farm in the vicinity of Horgoš in northern Serbia. The squat is predominantly inhabited by people on the move from Afghanistan, generally young men and teenagers. The people-on-the-move who had been living on the farm were relocated to camps hours away, forcing many of them to after make the long and difficult journey back to Northern Serbia on foot.

On 31st July, Bosnia and Herzegovina began the forced deportation of Pakistani citizens to Pakistan. Bosnia is the first country along the Balkan Route, which started this kind of deportation of Pakistani citizens, who, according to the country's institutions, were staying illegally in the territory.

Several updates are also shared regarding developments in Greece, where police sweeps in urban centers continue to target people-on-the-move through racial profiling. There were also attempts to evict Eleonas camp in the last month—one of the last refugee camps close to an urban centre in Greece—but was successfully prevented by the residents. A new online registration system for asylum applications was also launched in July, nearly eight months after the last online registration system was discontinued. On 15 July, Forensic Architecture, partnered with Forensis, published an interactive cartographic [platform](#) which documents, verifies and maps a months-long investigation into drift-backs in the Aegean Sea.

In two final sections, recent mass deportations from Turkey to Afghanistan, as well as reports of an increase in people-on-the-move arriving in Trieste, Italy mark changes in the routes, movement, and barriers encountered by people-on-the-move throughout the region.



Border Violence  
Monitoring Network

J U L Y  
R E P O R T  
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<sup>1</sup> \*BVMN is a network of watchdog organisations active in Greece and the Western Balkans including No Name Kitchen, Rigardu, AreYouSyrious, MobileInfoTeam, Push-back Alarm Austria Josoor, InfoKolpa, Centre for Peace Studies, BlindSpots, Mare Liberum, Collective Aid, and Fresh Response.

# TRENDS IN BORDER VIOLENCE

## PUSHBACKS FROM NORTH MACEDONIA TO GREECE

This month, BVMN recorded three pushbacks from North Macedonia to Greece impacting 44 people-on-the-move. Respondents describe being taken to a “camp” close to Gevgelija and the Greek–North Macedonian border to have their biometric data taken prior to being pushed back over the border ([4.2](#), [4.1](#)). This “camp” has been mentioned in previous testimonies of pushback survivors illegally returned to Greece from North Macedonia, and likely is in reference to the [Vinojug Temporary Transit Center](#).

All testimonies also mention the presence of foreign officers during the pushback, or in the camp. In all testimonies, some of the foreign officers are described by respondents as resembling Frontex officers, identifiable by light blue armbands with Frontex and EU logos (all). Respondents also mention the presence in some cases of German, Czech, and Croatian officers.

So far in 2022, the BVMN has recorded a total of 7 pushbacks, impacting 60 people-on-the-move. Of these, in six testimonies respondents mention the presence of foreign officers, and 3 specifically suggest the presence and complicity of Czech police in pushbacks along the Greek–North Macedonian border.

The presence of Czech officers working in collaboration with North Macedonian authorities in border enforcement goes back several years, and was first reported on by BVMN in late 2020. In December 2019, the Czech Prime Minister Andrej Babiš visited Macedonia and vowed to help the country ‘cope with the onslaught’ of migrants by sending Czech police officers to protect its borders. This coincided with a

recruitment drive for Frontex officers in the Czech Republic, offering training, apprenticeships and lucrative salaries of 4,500 euros per month. In 2019, 460 Czech police officers and 8 police dogs were dispatched to North Macedonia, while a further 246 officers and 6 police dogs followed in 2020. This was reportedly the 32nd contingent of Czech officers sent to Macedonia as part of bilateral cooperation between the two countries. As per a Czech report, 11,395 ‘illegal migrants’ were captured in Macedonia and Serbia in 2019, predominantly around Gevgelija, near the Greek border.

## PUSHBACKS FROM NORTH MACEDONIA TO GREECE

Trends in border violence in Bihac have gotten more violent in the month of June 2022. Volunteers of BVMN's partner organisation No Name Kitchen collected three testimonies (1.1., 1.2, 1.3) where the respondents recounted their apprehensions in the Bosnian–Croatian border. In all testimonies, respondents declared their intention of seeking asylum in Croatia. Nevertheless, they all got pushbacked without being taken into consideration by Croatian authorities. The modalities of pushback have also been particularly violent. The theft of personal belongings, including money, phones and power batteries, remains a common strategy used by Croatian authorities. In addition to this, we have observed an increase in physical violence, resulting in some cases in broken bones and serious injuries.

“[...] They have beaten us the entire time, they kicked us and beat us with batons, and the grip of the pistols”

With these words, a minor respondent from Afghanistan describes his apprehension by the Interventna Jedinica Policija (IJP) in the Croatian territory. In testimony 1.1, we report the use of pepper spray against a minor woman from Sierra Leone whilst she was already having difficulties breathing given the asphyxiating conditions with which she was being transported in the Croatian police van.

In the three testimonies collected, which included the presence of a family with a new-born baby, a group of young Afghan, and a family of three siblings from Sierra Leone, Croatian authorities did not detain POMs in any police stations but drove them, in overcrowded vans, back to the border where they forced people to walk back into Bosnia– often times in the proximity of Velika Kladusa.

Many POMs transiting through Bihac, with experiences of pushbacks from Croatia, have also mentioned a '7 days document' that Croatian

authorities have begun to present to people to sign. According to this document, POMs are allowed free movement within Croatia for a period of time of up to 7 days. Despite the existence of such a 'protection', Croatian authorities endure violent illegal pushbacks– also against POMs with this 7 days permit.

While the overall number of POMs staying in the Una Sana Canton has gone down compared to previous years, potentially also due to the extreme difficulties in crossing into Croatia and the consequential rise of new routes to the EU, people continue to be violently pushbacked on a daily basis.

# UPDATES ON THE SITUATION

## SLOVENIA / CROATIA


U.F. spent over a year in the Bosnian–Croatian border region after having made his way from Myanmar to the Balkans. As a Rohingya child, U.F. had to endure oppression and systematic violence against himself and his family in his home country. After a bomb attack on his village, the then 8-year-old fled Myanmar to live in safety elsewhere.

After years on the move, U.F. had to survive in the Bosnian–Croatian border region for over a year. For most of his time in the Bosnian Una Sana Canton, he found housing in unofficial squats. For him, like for thousand other people–on–the–move, the living conditions in the area were inhumane. U.F. struggled for food, had to wash himself in ice cold rivers and lived in dirty and unsafe abandoned buildings that offer little protection against the freezing cold temperatures of the Bosnian winter.


Over and over against U.F. tried to make use of his right to ask for

asylum in the EU. Repeatedly Croatian police forces caught him, beat him, humiliated him, stole, and burned his belongings and illegally expelled him back to the inhumane conditions in Bosnia. This violence, as well as the repeated pushbacks, are illegal under both domestic (Croatian) and international law. However, Croatia repeatedly disregarded the rights and protection mechanism that U.F. should have been entitled to under statutes such as the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.

In the summer of 2021 U.F. walked all the way to Slovenia in his attempt to reach safety in the EU. Yet again, he got caught by the (Slovenian) police, was subjected to physical and psychological violence, and sent back to Croatia and later to Bosnia (in a so called “chain–pushback”). Like the Croatian police, the Slovenian authorities ignored the basic rights granted by the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and breached national law and international human rights measures.



“In search of safety”  
By CRIN & Miriam  
Sugranyes




“Border violence”  
By CRIN & Miriam  
Sugranyes

U.F. was 17 years old when he finally reached Germany in autumn of 2021. U.F. wanted to fight the injustice that was done to him and is continuously being done to other children at the EU external borders. Together with the European Centre for Constitutional and Human Rights (ECCHR) and with the support of BVMN member organisation Blindspots, U.F. filed a complaint against Croatia and Slovenia in front of the UN Child’s Right Committee. His complaint is the

first of this kind and will hopefully set precedent against the mistreatment of children at the EU borders.

Learn more about the U.F.’s case, stay update on any upcoming development and the work of the ECCHR here:  
<https://www.ecchr.eu/en/case/pushbacks-un-child-rights-croatia-slovenia/>



“Through the dark”  
By CRIN & Miriam  
Sugranyes



# SERBIA

On Tuesday, July 26th, Serbian police conducted a large raid of a large abandoned farm in the vicinity of Horgoš in northern Serbia. The squat is predominantly inhabited by people on the move from Afghanistan, generally young men and teenagers. The raid was attended by Aleksandar Vulin, the Minister of Internal Affairs, as well as the heavily-armed Gendarmeria: a branch of the Serbian police who are generally only deployed in the face of a high risk to public safety or the government. The raid was [described by Vulin](#) as having aimed at "find[ing] various gangs and scum who carry weapons and take them to prisons, where they will face justice", before continuing; "Serbia is not a parking lot for migrants. Serbia will not allow our way of life to be changed in any way and jeopardized by the arrival of migrants or anyone else'. However, the vast majority of the '120 illegal migrants individuals' found in the raid had no affiliations with smuggling networks, with videos of the raid showing young men, women, and children sitting on the ground while police officers passed out a few bottles of water for the cameras and ruffled the hair of visibly scared children. The police forcibly took these individuals by bus to Kikinda camp in eastern Serbia, with



Photo: Aftermath of police raid

many walking for days to return to the north in the week following.

In the days following the raid the police returned up to three times a day to chase away people staying at the farm. The police also destroyed all of the non-concrete structures at



Photo: Aftermath of police raid

the farm, tearing down the modest shelters and homes that people on the move had painstakingly constructed to survive in the isolated location. In addition, unidentified men in civilian clothes and vehicles carrying handguns turned up at least on the two days following the raid, almost certainly from Serbian far-right groups.

While the population has returned to relatively high numbers again despite the police and far right activities, the raid has succeeded in forcing people into the surrounding woods, making it harder for people to survive and introducing the constant spectre of

violence and arrest. The raid was linked in Serbian media to a highly-publicised shooting in the woods north of Subotica in July. While the relation between the shooting and the location in Horgoš is unclear, it is apparent that the Afghan community has been particularly targeted in northern Serbia following the shooting. In addition, Vulin's position as Minister of Internal Affairs is currently precarious during the ongoing formation of the Serbian government; the highly publicised raids and his physical presence in front of the cameras are therefore likely part of a larger political show of strength on his part.



Photo: Aftermath of police raid

# BOSNIA & HERZEGOVINA

## BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA STARTED DEPORTING PEOPLE-ON-THE-MOVE TO PAKISTAN

On 31st July, Bosnia and Herzegovina began the forced deportation of Pakistani citizens to Pakistan. Bosnia is the first country along the Balkan Route, which started this kind of deportation of Pakistani citizens, who, according to the country's institutions, were staying illegally in the territory.

The Service for Foreigners' Affairs of Bosnia and Herzegovina deported the first group of migrants from Sarajevo International Airport on Sunday 31st July. This procedure was justified through the Readmission Agreement between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Pakistan, signed in November 2020 by the Minister of Security of Bosnia and Herzegovina Selmo Cikotić and the Minister of Interior of Pakistan Ijaz Ahmed Shah.

The Readmission Agreement between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Pakistan entered into force on 23rd July 2021. The Ministry of Security of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Selmo Cikotić, has initiated the procedure for signing readmission agreements with several other countries from which a large number of people on the move

through Bosnia and Herzegovina originate, in order to facilitate and speed up the procedures for their return to their countries of origin. Stating that they also intend to conclude such readmission agreements with Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Egypt and Morocco in order to "increase readmission capacity for better crisis management".

Such agreements are to the detriment of all people on the move travelling on the Balkan route to European countries, fleeing abuse and persecution. In addition, the BiH authorities believe that these agreements will discourage migrants from moving to BiH and going to the so-called 'game', leading the country itself to mechanism of European control to the detriment of migrants and refugees.

<https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/bosna-hercegovina-migranti-pakistan-deportacija/31967689.html>

# GREECE

## POLICE SWEEP OPERATIONS

On the 30th of April 2022, Border Violence Monitoring Network published [a press release](#) following the police operations which targeted people on the move who were on their way to collect food from a humanitarian distribution site in Thessaloniki (highlighted too in the [BVMN April Monthly Report](#)). These operations show no signs of abating as three months on, they continue to take place regularly, with authorities

systematically raiding targeted areas of the city and arresting groups of people on the grounds of being unable to provide legal documentation.

BVMN has been monitoring the presence of police at or in proximity to their distribution site since the end of April. Records show that authorities have been present at least once a week throughout May, June and July, in unmarked police cars or on motorbikes. Records

further indicate that police waited until after distribution activities to raid the area and ask people to present their documents.

For instance, on the 31st of May 2022, we observed one small marked police vehicle parked around the corner from the distribution site. The following day on the 1st of June, the police raided the distribution area after services had ceased for the day and apprehended 11–12 people. The arbitrary police operations are particularly concerning for undocumented members of the community and service users, who are at increased risk of pushback if apprehended. As a consequence, many are discouraged from coming and availing of basic humanitarian aid, such as food, sleeping bags, blankets, clothing, hygiene items, and medical assistance, exacerbating conditions of destitution.

We have collated press releases by the Greek police evidencing the arrests of people on the move since the end of April 2022, which explicitly state that operations are systematic and take place daily. In a vast [operation from the 6th of May 2022](#) to “deal with delinquency and identify

people residing illegally in Greek territory” 241 people were checked with three people being arrested. According to a [press release](#) from the 28th of June 2022, 14 people were “spontaneously arrested” for illegally staying in Greece, as part of the “implementation of special actions and targeted controls to prevent and deal with delinquency”. The police sweep operations are carried out in targeted areas such as squares, the wider city centre, bus and railway stations and even extend to the city suburbs. Operations will be “expanded to other areas” according to the [press release from 29th July](#), whereby 157 people were checked resulting in six arrests.

Since 2020, BVMN has been recording arrests in the city and its surrounding areas, with people being driven to the border with Turkey and pushed back. BVMN has equally recorded instances of pushbacks of people detained in administrative detention sites. In conjunction with the ongoing broom operations, this may be read as a deliberate move on the part of the Greek state to strengthen their system of containment, control, and illegal pushbacks.

## ■ ATTEMPTED EVICTION OF ELEONAS CAMP

On the 4th of July 2022, the Athens Municipal Council decided to proceed with the evacuation of the Eleonas Refugee Camp. This decision comes after months of resistance from residents of the camp to efforts to empty the camp.

[Eleonas Camp opened in August 2015](#) and was the first official temporary accommodation centre for asylum-seekers in Greece. It is located in an industrial area within the city limits of Athens and historically there have been strong connections between residents of the camp and migrant communities in greater Athens and solidarity movements. The closure of Eleonas is significant given broader

changes to the camp system in Greece, and in some ways is enigmatic of these changes: from a system of “open” camps located close to urban centers where residents had at least limited access to social support services and possibilities for work and social integration, to one of “closed controlled access centers” (CCACs) in remote locations, where residents are heavily surveilled by the authorities, isolated and out of sight of the broader society. Eleonas is one of the few urban camps left, as in the last years most similar camps have been closed and replaced with CCACs. In this way, the struggle against the eviction of Eleonas can be understood as one of the last stands against the

implementation of a camp system built on the mass incarceration and isolation of asylum seekers in Greece.

On the 28th of June, residents of Eleonas and solidarians [organized a demonstration](#) from the camp to the Ministry of Asylum and Migration, achieving a meeting with representatives of the Ministry. Other small clashes with authorities have happened on a regular basis over the last months, as the police in collaboration with the IOM and other actors have tried to force people to sign consent forms to be transferred to the new outlying camps.

An [open letter](#) and five demands from **“We, the people, the families, the asylum seekers of the refugee camp of Eleonas”** was released in late June, calling for:

1. The interruption of any attempt to close Eleonas camp.
2. The interruption of any attempt to forcibly displace the inhabitants of the camp.
3. The commitment by the Municipality of Athens and by the Ministry of Migration and Asylum, to ensure that the support activities carried out by the organizations and

the social workers operating in the camp are not to be interrupted.

4. The commitment by the Ministry of Migration and Asylum to guarantee the enjoyment of the Cash Assistance for the inhabitants of the camp, as established by the Estia program.

5. The commitment by the Ministry of Migration and Asylum to ensure that people transferred from refugee camps to housing projects under the Estia program over the last few months will not be forced to leave their homes before completing their asylum procedures.

In July, in the midst of ongoing struggles with increasingly restrictive measures in the camp, the new date for the eviction was set for mid-August. The residents and solidarians have put out an urgent call for solidarity and financial support to meet current needs, and prepare for a situation where many of those living in the camp may find themselves homeless.

Link to video created by residents and solidarians about the struggle: <https://ne-np.facebook.com/313463592321202/videos/586873043100302/?so=permalink>

## NEW PLATFORM FOR REGISTERING ASYLUM APPLICATIONS

In November 2021, the Greek government stopped the registration of first instance asylum claims via Skype for people on mainland Greece, Crete and Rhodes. At the same time, it announced the intention for all new arrivals to go through reception and identification centre procedures, but failed to provide such centres where people seeking asylum could realistically issue their claim. Although the Skype system was immensely flawed, it still provided some kind of entry to the asylum procedure through the possibility to pre-register a claim online in several languages. After the government limited the entry to the system to second instance asylum claims, individuals who were able to prove their vulnerability and those who

possessed a police note, filing an asylum application remained impossible for the large majority of people-on-the-move on mainland Greece, Crete and Rhodes.

In May this year, our member organization Mobile Info Team published a report highlighting the difficulties people face while staying forcibly undocumented in the country because of being unable to register their claim. Their research found men, women and children being constantly dependent on the mercy of others while often forced to sleep rough and being at high risk of labour and sexual exploitation.

After eight months of nearly no access to asylum, a new platform has now been launched by the

government for people to pre-register their applications. The registration can be made in eleven languages and is open to everyone who has not yet filed an application. First observations showed that appointments for the full registration of the claims were given from September 2022 onwards. Those appointments, which are still to be made in person, are to take place either at Diavata camp near

Thessaloniki or Malakasa camp close to Athens. At least at Malakasa there are no appointments available anymore until December 2022 and also January 2023 is already blocked. Even for vulnerable applicants there are no available appointments, neither on Skype. In this procedure of online registration, there is no option to prioritize vulnerable categories of groups.

## LAUNCH OF FA PLATFORM

On 15 July, Forensic Architecture, partnered with Forensis, published an interactive cartographic [platform](#) which documents, verifies and maps a months-long investigation into drift-backs in the Aegean Sea. The term drift-backs refers to the practice of abandoning people-on-the-move at sea, specifically by weaponising the geography of the Aegean, such as ocean currents, to illegally expel people back to Turkey. Boats are intercepted within Greek territorial waters, or people are arrested after they arrive on Greek shores, beaten, stripped of their possessions, and then forcefully loaded onto life rafts with no engine and left to drift back to the Turkish coast. The platform archives 1018 drift-backs involving 27,464 people since 28 February 2020. Of these cases, 26 were recorded where people were thrown directly into the sea by the Hellenic Coast Guard, and Frontex, the European border and coastguard agency was found to have been directly involved in 122 cases, as well as being aware of at least 417 cases. This investigation has created the most comprehensive archive documenting these incidents, compiling extensive verified data onto one platform which will continue to be updated.

BVMN's Research and Investigation working group participated in the team geolocating and verifying drift-back cases. The materials analysed

for the investigation were sourced from the monitoring efforts of Aegean Boat Report, AlarmPhone, Frontex's own database JORA (sourced from recent Lighthouse Reports Investigations), the Turkish Coast Guards website and other media sources documenting specific cases online. These materials are all openly available, and include extensive visual documentation of events by people-on-the-move as they experienced drift-backs. Individual interviews with survivors or relatives of people were also carried out to substantiate evidence.

Drift-backs operate on a continuum of border violence, where illegal expulsions have become a systematic practice particularly heightened at the external borders of Europe. Despite pushbacks being a routine occurrence at the Greece-Turkey border, their scale and severity continues to worsen and manifest in new ways.

# TURKEY

Since the violent takeover of the government in Afghanistan by the Taliban in August 2021, the number of Afghan nationals coming to Turkey is on the rise. Most of them cross the border from Iran, which also hosts a large community of Afghans, often undocumented and at risk of deportation. Rising simultaneously is the overall animosity against the refugees and migrants in the country throughout the Turkish population, which itself suffers under a continuously deteriorating economy and mounting inflation. In addition to the estimated half a million Afghans, approximately 3.7 million Syrian refugees are currently living in Turkey, seen by many as a threat to their own economic situation.

As a consequence and in prospect of the upcoming elections in June 2023, the government aims to ease the increasing tensions within the society and gain support by the voters through deporting refugees and migrants in large numbers to their countries of origin. Reports of deportations to Afghanistan, a country currently undergoing a severe humanitarian crisis, have already caused an international outcry in April this year. Most European countries issued memorandums of deportations to Afghanistan, recognizing the dire

conditions under the rule of the Taliban, who are accused of excessive human rights violations. The devastating conditions in the country further prompted the United Nations to launch its largest single-country humanitarian assistance appeal for about \$4,4 billion in 2022, rating it as thereby as one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world.

Undeterred by numerous voices from the international community assessing the deportations as non-compliant with international law, more than 20,000 Afghan nationals have been repatriated in the first half of this year, according to the state-run Anadolu Agency. In January 2022, Turkey was the second country, following Pakistan, to resume direct flights to Afghanistan. Within the past six months, 79 Turkish chartered deportation flights have landed at Kabul international airport, according to Turkish officials and the International Organization for Migration (IOM). A change of these abusive deportation politics is out of sight: Currently, Turkey is holding 24,344 foreigners of 89 nationalities in administrative detention, waiting for their deportation.

# ITALY

The hot summer of 2022 saw in July a consistent increase of arrivals from the Balkan Route in Piazza Libertà in Trieste, with most of those arriving coming from Pakistan, Afghanistan and Bangladesh, plus smaller numbers from Nepal, Turkish Kurdistan and India. The main organizations operating in the square are as always Linea d'Ombra, IRC, Diaconia Valdese and ICS, plus a great number of volunteers coming for short periods from all over Italy – without them, the situation would be tragic.

The warm weather makes it easier to travel for POMs, and the easily predictable spike in numbers witnessed the total impreparation of the welcoming system and the public authorities, with overflowing facilities and an estimated 40 to 50 people, who actually have the right to get a roof over their heads, sleeping in the streets everyday, including families with women and young children.

Already from the first days of July, many POM showing intention to seek asylum, or captured by the police, were granted a permit to stay in

facilities that are overcrowded, therefore refusing the access and resulting in more and more people showing up daily in Piazza Libertà, beside the new arrivals, to get at least one meal, which should instead be provided by the institutions.

Apparently, the tourist season is at its best in Trieste, with huge positive economic forecasts for the industry. The presence of poor, hungry people camping around the city's train station was considered unacceptable by the mayor Roberto Dipiazza, who made statements about fencing the square and chasing away all POM, ignoring that the lack of welcoming facilities is its primary fault. Police then started showing up everyday in Piazza Libertà, scaring migrants, identifying them and reaching the absurdity of giving them fines for abusive camping. The problem with bivouacking is indeed connected to the presence of tourists.

In July 2022 Trieste witnessed the continuation and worsening of situation already stated in June's report, reaching such an embarrassing point for the public institutions that the mayor and the head of prefecture decided to open a coordination table that might lead to the re-opening of the daily center in via Udine, closed since March 2020.

<https://www.meltingpot.org/2022/07/trieste-la-strategia-per-allontanare-le-persone-migranti-e-le-associazioni-da-piazza-della-liberta/>

<https://ilpiccolo.gelocal.it/trieste/cronaca/2022/07/15/news/prime-multe-da-100-euro-l-una-per-i-bivacchi-in-piazza-liberta-1.41568251>

<https://www.triesteprema.it/cronaca/multe-migranti-ics.html>



<b>Link</b>	<b>Incident</b>	<b>Recorded</b>	<b>Demographic</b>	<b>Group Size</b>
<b>Hungary To Serbia</b>				
<a href="#">1.1</a>	1 <sup>st</sup> July	1 <sup>st</sup> July	Afghanistan, Morocco, Tunisia	20
<a href="#">1.2</a>	15 <sup>th</sup> March	7 <sup>th</sup> July	Afghanistan	11
<a href="#">1.3</a>	15 <sup>th</sup> March	8 <sup>th</sup> July	Morocco, Tunisia	unknown
<b>Croatia to Bosnia-Herzegovina</b>				
<a href="#">2.1</a>	6 <sup>th</sup> July	/	Afghanistan	5
<a href="#">2.2</a>	7 <sup>th</sup> July	/	Pakistan	6
<a href="#">2.3</a>	8 <sup>th</sup> July	15 <sup>th</sup> July	Afghanistan	3
<a href="#">2.4</a>	13 <sup>th</sup> July	13 <sup>th</sup> July	Afghanistan	7
<a href="#">2.5</a>	16 <sup>th</sup> July		Cuba, Democratic Republic of Congo	18
<a href="#">2.6</a>	17 <sup>th</sup> July		Afghanistan	6
<a href="#">2.7</a>	24 <sup>th</sup> July	25 <sup>th</sup> July	Pakistan	4
<a href="#">2.7</a>	26 <sup>th</sup> July	31 <sup>st</sup> July	Afghanistan, Pakistan, Turkey	33
<a href="#">2.8</a>	29 <sup>th</sup> July	31 <sup>st</sup> July	Afghanistan	5
<a href="#">2.9</a>	30 <sup>th</sup> July	30 <sup>th</sup> July	Afghanistan	4
<a href="#">2.10</a>	31 <sup>st</sup> July	31 <sup>st</sup> July	Congo	7
<b>Greece To Turkey</b>				
<a href="#">3.1</a>	29 <sup>th</sup> May	20 <sup>th</sup> July	Libya, Afghanistan. Syria, Morocco, Algeria	100
<b>N Macedonia to Greece</b>				
<a href="#">4.1</a>	25 <sup>th</sup> March		Afghanistan, Morocco, Tunisia	23
<a href="#">4.2</a>	26 <sup>th</sup> June	11 <sup>th</sup> July	Morocco, Tunisia	18
<a href="#">4.3</a>	27 <sup>th</sup> June	11 <sup>th</sup> July	Morocco, Tunisia	<b>3</b>

# NETWORK STRUCTURE AND CONTACT

B	O	R	D	E	R				
V	I	O	L	E	N	C	E		
M	O	N	I	T	O	R	I	N	G
N	E	T	W	O	R	K			

BVMN is a volunteer led endeavor, acting as an alliance of organisations in the Western Balkans and Greece. BVMN is based on the efforts of participant organizations working in the field of documentation, media, advocacy and litigation. We finance the work through charitable grants and foundations, and are not in receipt of funds from any political organisation. The expenditures cover transport subsidies for volunteers in the field and four paid positions.

To follow more from the Border Violence Monitoring Network, check out our [website](#) for the entire testimony archive, previous monthly reports and regular news pieces. To follow us on social media, find us on Twitter handle [@Border Violence](#) and on [Facebook](#). For further information regarding this report or more on how to become involved please email us at [mail@borderviolence.eu](mailto:mail@borderviolence.eu). For press and media requests please contact: [press@borderviolence.eu](mailto:press@borderviolence.eu)



**Border Violence  
Monitoring Network**